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Abstract 
This paper studies the effect of cash holding on firm value for a sample of Chinese 
industrial firm during 2010-2013. The study tests the existence of a linear relationship between 
cash holding and firm value. Then the study tests if a quadratic relationship exists. The results 
show that a linear relationship exists, and a quadratic relationship is not proved to exist between 
cash holding and firm value for Chinese industrial companies. 
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1: Introduction 
In finance literature, cash holding has been drawing increasing attention. While many 
studies focus on the factors influencing company’s cash holding, there are few studies focusing 
on the direct relationship between cash holding and firm value. 
Cash holding has both benefits and costs for the firm. 
Firstly, for precautionary motives, cash holding can protect a firm from a certain level of 
cash shortfall since firms have liquidity risk and unexpected contingencies; Secondly, for 
transactional motives, cash holdings can give firms the liquidity for transactions (Keynes, 1936).  
On the other hand, excess cash holding may cause agency problems since the interests of 
management are usually at the odds with that of shareholders. With too much cash on hand, 
mangers may tend to manage poorly and encourage imprudent acquisition and expansion (Jensen, 
1986).  And also, holding cash is an opportunity cost because of the lower financial return of 
liquid assets. 
Based on the samples from 35 countries, Pinkowitz (2006) studied the relationship 
between firm value and cash holding in firms. The results showed that compared with firms in 
countries protecting investors well, firms in countries do not protect investors well have weaker 
firm value and cash holding relationship, and cash values in those countries are lower. 
In the Kim et al. (1998) model, a firm has an optimal cash holding level, as the outcome 
of the trade-off between the costs and benefits of having liquid assets. M. Sola, G. Teruel and M. 
Solano (2010) tested the model empirically using a sample of 472 listed US industrial companies 
during 2001-2007 and found the existence of optimal cash holding levels.  
The relationship between firm value and cash holding is influenced by how well the firm 
is protected in the country it performs, and cases in developed and developing countries may 
differ. Therefore, our study intends to cover the lag in the literature and provide insights into the 
relationship between the firm value and cash holding in developing countries with less investor 
protection, such as China. 
This paper contributes to the literature by testing empirically if firms have an optimum 
cash level at which to maximize their value in China. The study first adapted the model to 
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China’s situation by adding factors that may influence firm value (Yanmei SUN , Changyun 
WANG). Then we used regression analysis to explore the relationship between firm value and 
cash holding using a sample of 2,261 listed Chinese industrial companies during the period from 
2010 to 2013. The result shows that a linear relationship, instead of a non-linear (concave) one, 
between cash holdings and firm value exists. We also looked into the relationship and explained 
the differences between the relationships in US and Chinese firms. 
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 reviews corporate finance literature, focusing 
on cash and firm value literature. Section 3 gives a general description of the sample and 
variables employed. Section 4 describes the linear model linking cash holding and firm value and 
reports the results. The main conclusions and implications of the study conclude the paper. 
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2: Literature Review 
According to the traditional corporate finance (Stiglitz 1974), firms could get enough 
external finance and invest based on the projects’ NPVs in the perfect market. Keeping cash 
would have no influence on firm value because of the absence of a premium for liquidity and 
taxes. So, keeping liquid financial assets would be irrelevant and decisions about investment in 
liquid assets would not affect shareholders’ wealth (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 
2001). However, since the market is imperfect, the irrelevance does not hold. 
As for positive aspects of holding cash, there are three motives mainly (Keynes, 1936). 
Transaction motive refers to the need to hold cash for activities associated with a firm's ongoing 
operation. A firm use cash for the purchase of goods, payment of salary, wages, rent, interest, tax, 
insurance, dividend and so on. In the meantime, it receives cash in terms of sales revenue, interest 
on loan, return on investments made outside the firm and so on. If these receipts and payments 
were perfectly synchronized, a firm would not have to hold cash for transaction motive. However, 
cash inflows and outflows cannot be matched exactly in reality. Precautionary motive refers to 
the need to hold cash as a safety margin as a financial reserve. A firm should hold some cash for 
the payment of unpredictable or unanticipated events such as strikes and lock-up from employees 
increase in cost of raw materials, funds and labour, fall in market demand and so on. The 
speculative motive refers to the need to hold cash in order to be able to take advantage of bargain 
purchases that might arise, attractive interest rates and favourable exchange rate fluctuations. 
Some firms hold cash other than transaction and precautionary needs for speculative motive. 
Speculative needs require a firm to have possible profitable opportunities to exploit, which are 
out of the normal course of business. These opportunities arise in conditions, when price of raw 
material is expected to fall, when interest rate on borrowed funds are expected to decline and 
purchase of inventory occurs at reduced price on immediate cash payment. 
As for negative aspects of holding cash, there are two major costs.  According to Dittmar, 
Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003), holding liquid assets implies an opportunity cost because of the 
lower return compared with other investments. In addition, because of the lack of monitoring by 
capital market, the benefit of corporate liquidity in investing in projects without rising outside 
funds may cause a cost.  According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), large cash reserves can 
increase agency conflicts between managers and shareholders because managers can waste funds 
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on inefficient investment that offers non-pecuniary benefits but destroys shareholder value or on 
their own pet projects.  
Firms’ cash holdings are influenced by many kinds of factors such as the country’s 
economic and lawful environment, the companies’ financial management strategies, the 
companies’ financial situations and governance structures. 
According to the studies on China’s listed companies, the cash holdings characteristics 
are quite different from those of US companies. The average cash holding in 1998-2007 was 24% 
in China (Zhu Jigao, Lu Zhengfei, 2009), which is much higher than that of US companies. In 
addition, the government is the controlling shareholder in a large number of Chinese firms in 
China. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1994), state-assigned managers may act in the interest 
of the politicians who control them rather than the interests of the firms. Therefore, conflicts often 
arise between firms and politicians in China and there are many agency problems. 
However, Chinese companies have higher ownership concentration than US companies 
(Wang, 2001). Han and Song (2004) studied the relationship between ownership concentration 
and agency costs in 1080 listed Chinese firms, and the result shows a negative relationship. So it 
is hard to decide if Chinese companies have higher agency costs then US companies. 
From what discussed before, we can see the trade-off to determine a firm’s optimal cash 
holding between the costs and benefits of having liquid assets in China could be different from 
that in the US. 
In order to fill the gap in the literature, this paper studies how the firm’s cash holdings 
influence its value. The study tends to find the relationship between firm value and cash holdings 
in Chinese listed companies and explain the reason of the difference between the relationships in 
US and Chinese companies. 
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3: Data and Variables 
 
3.1 Data 
We used a sample of Chinese publically traded firms from 2010 to 2013 to explore the 
relationship between cash holding and firm value. Considering the differences in regulations and 
reporting standards, all financial services companies are excluded. The study used accounting 
data from annual financial reports and daily share prices. All data is from COMPUSTAT 
database. 
We have eliminated observations with errors or lost values from the sample and 
observations with negative equity or negative cash. To minimize the influence of extreme 
outliers, we also deleted the highest and lowest 1 percent of key variable observations. The result 
is 2,261 companies representing 7,258 firm-year observations. We did not use a sample of 
balanced panel data in order to avoid surveillance bias. 
3.2 Variables 
We used firm value as the dependent variable. Tobin’s Q is a widely used proxy for firm 
value in previous studies (reference here). As the Tobin’s Q data for Chinese companies is not 
included in COMPUSTAT database, we used a simple approximation of Tobin’s Q suggested by 
Chung and Pruitt (1994), calculated as follow: 
𝑄 = 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 +𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡  
To test the robustness of the results, we also used another proxy for firm value, the 
market-to-book ratio, calculated as follow: 
𝑀𝐵𝑅 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  
Key independent variable is CASH. CASH is cash and cash equivalents at the beginning 
of the year divided by total assets. The study also include control variables including change in 
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cash holding, earnings before interests and taxes, total cash flow, leverage, firm size and 
intangible assets. Descriptions of variables are included in Table 1. 
Notice that we used the intangible asset divided by total assets as an approximation of the 
growth opportunity of firms. In previous studies, R&D expense is usually used (Fama and 
French, 1998). However, for Chinese companies, data of R&D expense is hard to obtain. We 
found that over 90% of the firms do not have the data. So we used the intangible asset as a proxy 
as suggested by M. Sola, G. Teruel and M. Solano (2010). 
Table 1. Descriptions of variables 
 
Variable Description 
Q Tobin’s Q approximation. 
MBR Market-to-book ratio. 
CASH Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of the year divided by 
total assets. 
DCASH Change in cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets 
EBIT Earnings before interests and taxes divided by total assets. 
CFLOW Total cash flow divided by total assets. 
LEV Total debt divided by total equity. 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets. 
INT Intangible assets divided by total assets. 
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Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of variables. We can see that the mean and 
median of cash holding is 17.7% and 13.0% for Chinese industrial companies, which is in line 
with the values in previous studies (16.1% and 13.2%, Sun and Wang, 2011). However, they are 
much larger compared to the values in the U.S. market, 7.9% and 4.4% according to studies in M. 
Sola, G. Teruel and M. Solano (2010). This indicates that Chinese companies have more 
financing constraints, and they tend to hold more cash. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
Variable Observation Means Std. Dev. Median 10 percentile 90 percentile 
Q 7258 2.101 1.209 1.762 1.010 3.651 
MBR 7258 2.918 2.149 2.383 1.027 5.344 
CASH 7258 0.177 0.142 0.130 0.042 0.394 
DCASH 7258 0.017 0.128 0.001 -0.104 0.137 
EBIT 7258 0.047 0.046 0.045 -0.005 0.105 
CFLOW 7258 0.065 0.042 0.061 0.022 0.117 
LEV 7258 1.138 1.121 0.785 0.185 2.555 
SIZE 7258 8.088 1.269 7.877 6.707 9.802 
INT 7258 0.020 0.040 0.004 0.000 0.060 
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Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for variables. There is no significant correlation 
between the independent variables. 
Table 3. Correlation matrix for variables. 
 
 Q MBR CASH DCASH EBIT CFLOW LEV SIZE INT 
Q 1.00         
MBR 0.86 1.00        
CASH 0.22 0.06 1.00       
DCASH 0.12 0.08 -0.43 1.00      
EBIT 0.27 0.16 0.11 0.13 1.00     
CFLOW 0.33 0.18 0.13 0.09 0.37 1.00    
LEV -0.32 -0.03 -0.35 -0.05 -0.24 -0.38 1.00   
SIZE -0.46 -0.38 -0.28 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.48 1.00  
INT 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.11 1.00 
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4: Model Design and Results of Regression 
4.1 Model Design 
We built the following model to explore the relationship between cash holding and firm 
value.  
Model 1: 𝑉!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻!" + 𝛽!𝐷𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊!" + 𝛽!𝐿𝐸𝑉!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑁𝑇!" + 𝜀!" 
The dependent variable (𝑉!") is the firm value for firm i at time t. Independent variables 
include CASH, which measures the cash holding level of the firm in the previous year. DCASH is 
the change in cash holding between the previous year and current year. CFLOW is the total cash 
flow of the firm. LEV is the leverage. SIZE is the size of the firm. DIV is the cash dividend and 
INT measures the growth opportunity of the firm. 
We also built another model to see if firm value is related with CASH squared. As some 
previous studies show that there is a concave relationship between cash holding and firm value. 
(M. Sola, G. Teruel and M. Solano, 2010)  
Model 2: 𝑉!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻!"! + 𝛽!𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻!" + 𝛽!𝐷𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊!" + 𝛽!𝐿𝐸𝑉!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸!"+ 𝛽!𝐼𝑁𝑇!" + 𝜀!" 
Model 2 only differs from Model 1 by adding a variable  𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻!"!, which is CASH 
squared. 
We used fitlm function in Matlab 2014_b, which uses OLS method, to do the regression. 
We also used robust regression to minimize the influence of outliers. We fit the data in model 1 
first and then in model 2 to see if the result is better using a quadratic regression. 
4.2 Results of regression 
Table 4 presents the result of estimation of model 1 and model 2. The first two columns 
are results from Model 1 and the last two columns are results from Model 2. In the first and the 
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third column, Tobin’s Q is used as dependent variable. In the second and the fourth column, 
market-to-book ratio is used as dependent variable. Values of t-statistics are in brackets. “***”, 
“**” and “*” mean that the efficiency is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Table 4. Results of estimation 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Q MBR Q MBR 
CASH 
0.778*** 
(11.288) 
0.343*** 
(2.668) 
0.672*** 
(3.4408) 
1.435*** 
(3.942) 
DCASH 
1.200*** 
(16.679) 
1.089*** 
(8.106) 
1.194*** 
(16.4189) 
1.155*** 
(8.524) 
EBIT 
2.253*** 
(8.241) 
4.609*** 
(9.025) 
2.259*** 
(8.247) 
4.527*** 
(8.872) 
CFLOW 
3.455*** 
(11.012) 
5.440*** 
(9.285) 
3.442*** 
(10.958) 
5.495*** 
(9.391) 
LEV 
0.023** 
(2.478) 
0.314*** 
(18.514) 
0.022** 
(2.423) 
0.318*** 
(18.685) 
SIZE 
-0.320*** 
(-43.485) 
-0.625*** 
(-45.417) 
-0.320*** 
(-43.404) 
-0.624*** 
(-45.413) 
INT 
0.876*** 
(4.389) 
1.367*** 
(3.666) 
0.874*** 
(4.375) 
1.370*** 
(3.682) 
CASH^2   
0.190 
(0.588) 
-1.930*** 
(-3.201) 
R-squared 0.411 0.318 0.410 0.319 
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As can be seen from the results of Model 1, a positive relationship exists between cash 
holding and firm value. The coefficient of CASH is positive and is significant at 1% level. This 
shows that firms holding more cash in the previous year have higher value in the current year. 
The stability of the estimated coefficients among different proxies of firm value demonstrates the 
robustness of results of our study.  The result shows that advantages of holding more cash 
overweigh the disadvantages. Firms holding more cash could take the chance of profitable 
investments and build firm value. Also, a higher cash holding level in the previous year may be a 
sign of the need of future capital investments, which would also add to the firm value. 
As to the control variables, DCASH has a positive coefficient, which is significant at 1% 
level. This indicates that firms that are increasing cash holding have higher firm value. This 
further put more robustness on our study. EBIT, CFLOW and INT are all positively related to 
firm value. LEV has a positive but quite small coefficient, which is also significant at 1% level. 
Size is negatively related to firm value and is significant at 1% level.  
For Model 2, we can see that the results are very different for the two proxies of firm 
value. When Tobin’s Q is used, the result indicates a convex relationship. However, when MBR 
is used, the result indicates a concave relationship. Furthermore, the coefficient of CASH^2 for 
Tobin’s Q model is not significant. Thus, we cannot conclude that a concave relationship exists 
for the sample data. 
Overall, the result of estimation shows that a linear relationship exists between cash 
holding and firm value for Chinese industrial companies. Cash holding is positively related to 
firm value. Increasing cash holding will constantly increase firm value and an optimal level does 
not exist for Chinese industrial companies. 
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5: Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to explore the relationship between corporate cash holding and 
firm value. The paper studied a sample of 2,261 Chinese industrial public companies for the 
period from 2010 to 2013.  
The result of the study shows that, for Chinese market:  
1. Cash holding is positively related to firm value. 
2. For the sample used in this paper, the existence of an optimal level of cash holding 
cannot be verified. 
This result is different with studies in US market, which shows that an optimal level of 
cash holding exists and the relationship between cash holding and firm value is concave (M. Sola, 
G. Teruel and M. Solano, 2010). 
The main reason for the difference may be the inefficiency of Chinese financing market. 
Compared with US companies, Chinese companies have more financing constraints; hence they 
may not always be able to finance projects with positive NPVs. This makes cash more valuable 
for Chinese companies than for US companies, and this is also the reason why Chinese 
companies tend to hold more cash than US companies do.  
Furthermore, as ownership of Chinese companies is more concentrated, majority 
shareholders can impose more control on the company. In this way, the agency problem caused 
by a high level of cash holding will have less influence on the firm value. 
As stated above, for Chinese companies, advantages of holding cash overweigh 
disadvantages at all cash levels, and a linear positive relationship exists between cash holding and 
firm value. 
We have also tried including data of year 2008 and 2009 to explore the effect of financial 
crisis on relationship between cash holding and firm value. We added a dummy variable whose 
value is 1 for year 2008 and 2009 and is 0 for other years. The result shows that the coefficient of 
the dummy variable is insignificant. This indicates that the financial crisis did not have much 
influence on Chinese industrial market. This is because Chinese market is to some extent isolated 
from the global market and therefore is not severely influenced by the crisis. 
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